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Abstract
This paper describes and analyzes research on the dynamics of long-
term care and suggests directions for the literature to make progress.
We discuss sources and causes of dynamics including inertia/state depen-
dence (confounded by unobserved heterogeneity); match-specic e¤ects;
and costs of changing caregivers. We comment on causes of dynam-
ics including learning/human capital accumulation; burnout; and game-
playing. We suggest how to deal with endogenous geography; dynamics
in discrete and continuous choices; and equilibrium issues (multiple equi-
libria, dynamic equilibria). Next, we evaluate the advantages of di¤erent
potential data sources (NLTCS, PSID, AHEAD/HRS, SHARE, ELSA)
and identify rst order data problems including noisy measures of wealth
and family structure. We suggest some methods to handle econometric
problems such as endogeneity (work, geography) and measurement error.
Finally, we discuss potential policy implications of dynamics including the
e¤ect of dynamics on parameter estimates and direct policy implications
of inertia (implications for family welfare, parent welfare, child welfare,
and cost of government programs).
1 Introduction
There has been a long, multidisciplinary, and robust literature on how families
make decisions about caring for older parents. Most of the literature has ignored
dynamics associated with the decision-making process. However, it is clear that
dynamics plays an important role in the process. For example, learning about
how to provide care e¤ectively, burnout, asset decumulation, and other issues
cause dynamic e¤ects that can have signicant impacts on the decision-making
process.
In this paper, we discuss the relatively small literature on the dynamics
of long-term care and suggest directions for the literature to make progress.
We discuss sources and causes of dynamics including inertia/state dependence
(confounded by unobserved heterogeneity); match-specic e¤ects; and costs of
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changing caregivers. We comment on causes of dynamics including learn-
ing/human capital accumulation; burnout; and game-playing. We also com-
ment on relevant econometric issues including the potential for endogenous ge-
ography; dynamics in discrete and continuous choices; and equilibrium issues
(multiple equilibria, dynamic equilibria). We evaluate the advantages of di¤er-
ent potential data sources (NLTCS, PSID, AHEAD/HRS, SHARE, ELSA) and
identify rst order data problems including noisy measures of wealth and fam-
ily structure. We suggest some methods to handle econometric problems such
as endogeneity (work, geography) and measurement error. Finally, we discuss
potential policy implications of dynamics including the e¤ect of dynamics on
parameter estimates and direct policy implications of inertia (implications for
family welfare, parent welfare, child welfare, and cost of government programs).
2 Empirical Issues
A variety of data sources are available that contain information that is useful to
study the dynamics of long-term care of elderly people. We focus on ve data
sets that are used in the literature. These are the Study of Assets and Health
Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD)/Health and Retirement Survey
(HRS), The Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE),
The English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID), and the National Long Term Care Survey (NLTCS). Table
1 provides a summary.
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Survey Countries Survey Sample Age of Further
Included Years Size Respondent Information
AHEAD/HRS United States 1993, 1995, 1998,
then every 2 years
8,222 70+ and
spouses
hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/
SHARE 20 European
Countries
2004, 2006, 2009,
2011
55,000 50+ share-project.org.
ELSA England every 2 years
starting in 2002
13,500 50+ natcen.ac.uk/elsa/
PSID United States Annually from 1968
to 1997, then every
2 years
18,000 18+ psidonline.isr.umich.edu
NLTCS United States 1982, 1984, 1989,
1994, 1999, and
2004
20,000 65+ nltcs.aas.duke.edu/
Table 1: Overview of Common Data Sources
All ve surveys are longitudinal and contain information on respondents for
at least six waves. AHEAD/HRS, SHARE, and ELSA were specically devel-
oped with the intent to be comparable to each other, while each covers di¤erent
world geographic regions. Each of the ve surveys contain information on
household member demographics such as sex, age, marital status, and number
of children. Information regarding health status varies across the surveys but
includes self-reported general health as well as di¢ culties with activities of daily
living (ADLs) and instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs).
Especially relevant is the current living and nancial situation of the elderly
respondent. Typical information acquired includes specics about the respon-
dents current housing situation, housing-related expenses, ownership of durable
goods, and expenditure on food. Financial information such as working status
and pension receipts is included in many surveys.
Assets are potentially important characteristics that inuence an elderly
individuals caregiving needs and opportunities in that the ability to purchase
care may reduce an individuals dependence on relatives and it may a¤ect ones
eligibility for Medicaid funding for nursing home care. There are many well-
known issues associated with obtaining accurate wealth and assets information.
For example, there is a high incidence of missing data either because individuals
are unwilling to provide the information or unable to determine the value. This
makes wealth imputation di¢ cult. The PSID survey developed a method,
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called unfolding brackets, to deal with this issue (Juster et. al., 2006). This
involves a series of questions in which the respondent is asked to categorize their
assets into ranges, where the ranges get progressively smaller. All of the data
sets surveyed here include questions about wealth, income, and assets that use
unfolding brackets.
Unfortunately, several issues remain with the asset data reported in AHEAD.
One issue concerns large, spurious changes in assets within families across time
due to changes in the survey structure (for details, see Hurd, Juster, and Smith,
2003 and Juster et al., 2007). The large variation in asset changes is particularly
problematic for dynamic studies where transitions are important.1 Another
issue is that, among wealthier individuals, 1993 assets are understated by a
factor of two, and income and asset reports in the second wave are inconsistent
with the 1993 wave. This was not resolved in subsequent waves where mean
assets double between the second and third waves. Another issue concerns
underreporting: nancial measures, particularly those related to equity in a
second home, are under-reported (Hurd, Juster, and Smith, 2003; Juster et al.,
2007) as are income measures (Hurd, Juster, and Smith, 2003).
Each survey also contains information on the family structure and social
support of the elderly. Typical items include number of siblings of the respon-
dent and the respondents circumstances in childhood. Some also survey the
children of respondents (AHEAD/HRS, SHARE, NLTCS) as well as caregivers
of the respondents (AHEAD/HRS, NLTCS Caregivers Survey). However, the
level of detail provided about children and caregivers varies across the data sets.
We now discuss each dataset in more detail.
2.1 The Study of Assets and Health Dynamics Among the
Oldest Old
AHEAD was rst administered in 1993 to a nationally representative sample
of around 6000 Americans age 70 and older. Spouses of respondents are also re-
spondents even if they would not otherwise qualify on the basis of their own age,
thus increasing the sample size for the initial wave to 8222 respondents. The
rst wave interviewed only individuals who were living in the community. These
respondents were re-interviewed in 1995, 1998, and every two years thereafter.
Subsequent waves retain all living respondents; thus later waves include nurs-
ing home residents. In 1998, the AHEAD survey was merged with the (closely
related) Health and Retirement Survey (HRS).2
The survey focuses on the joint dynamics of health and demographic char-
acteristics. The survey contains detailed information on characteristics that in-
uence an elderly individuals caregiving choices such as the nancial help and
time help provided by family members (most notably children). The presence
of a spouse may reduce an elderly individuals need for assistance from adult
children or from formal care providers, particularly if the spouse is relatively
1Hill (2006) also nds unusual variation in changes in assets in HRS.
2Skira (2012), for example, uses potential caregivers in HRS for a study of caregiver be-
havior.
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young and healthy; thus, the survey includes detailed information on both the
spouse, such as the spouses age, and the spouses activity limitations.
2.2 The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement
SHARE in Europe is a cross-national panel of more than 55000 individuals
aged 50 or older that reside in one of 20 European countries. Eleven countries
were involved in the 2004 baseline study, which included Denmark, Sweden,
Austria, France, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy,
and Greece. The second wave (in 2006) included information from Israel,
the Czech Republic, Poland, and Ireland. The surveys third wave, SHARE-
LIFE, has collected detailed retrospective life-histories in fourteen countries in
2008-09. The survey contains a number of elements useful to study the dynam-
ics of care including health related variables (e.g., self-reported health, health
conditions and physical functioning, and use of health care facilities), biomark-
ers (e.g., grip strength and body-mass index) and psychological variables (e.g.,
psychological health, well-being, and life satisfaction). SHARE also collects
information about economic variables (e.g., current work activity, job charac-
teristics, sources and composition of current income, wealth and consumption,
housing, and education). As with the AHEAD/HRS survey, SHARE collects
information on provision of care and social support such as assistance within
families, transfers of income and assets, and social networks.
2.3 The English Longitudinal Study of Ageing
ELSA is a panel survey in England that was started in 2002. It contains infor-
mation on respondents aged 50 and over and their partners (regardless of age)
who were living in the community at the survey start. As with AHEAD/HRS
and SHARE, ELSA collects information on health, biometric measures, eco-
nomic situation, and quality of life. As it was developed to be comparable to
the previous two studies, it also contains extensive information on social sup-
port, caregiving arrangements, and housing as well as individual and household
characteristics.
2.4 The Panel Study of Income Dynamics
The PSID began in 1968 with a nationally representative sample of over 18000
individuals living in 5000 families in the United States. Information on these in-
dividuals and their descendants has been collected continuously including data
covering employment, income, wealth, expenditures, health, marriage, child-
bearing, child development, philanthropy, education, and numerous other topics.
Unlike the previous datasets, only one person in the household is interviewed,
although they are asked questions about their spouse if they are married, and
about their parents living arrangements including where the parent resided
and for how long (in the Parental Supplement). Interviews were collected on
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an annual basis between 1968 and 1997 and then biennially thereafter. Sur-
vey content changes slightly across waves, but many content areas have been
measured consistently since 1968. Unfortunately these data to do not contain
extensive information on caregivers or children. But, given the length of the
data, they provide a wealth of information about the dynamics of the elderly
population.
2.5 The National Long Term Care Survey
The NLTCS is a longitudinal survey of Americans aged 65 and over. The survey
began in 1982 and was designed to study changes in the health and functional
status of respondents. The initial sample size was over 20000, and follow-up
surveys were conducted in 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004. It contains many
components that are valuable for studying the elderly population including dis-
ability measures, medical conditions, education levels, and income. In addition,
it contains information on caregivers (both paid and unpaid), family support,
and institutionalization. As well as extensive nancial information relating to
insurance, medical providers, and Medicare and Medicaid. In four waves (1982,
1989, 1999, and 2004), ancillary surveys were conducted including a caregiver
survey that contains data on informal caregivers themselves and a survey ad-
ministered to survivors of sample persons who had died between 1982 and 1984
and again between 1994 and 1999. The long time periods between waves have
advantages and disadvantages, but low usage of the data, at least in economics,
suggest that the disadvantages dominate.
3 Literature on Dynamics of Long-Term Care
The literature on dynamics of long-term care models is relatively new. In this
section, we describe and analyze six papers that have moved the frontier in this
area. We describe each paper in and of itself, and, in the next section, we t
each of the papers into a more general approach to modelling the dynamics of
long-term care and family decision-making.
Dostie and Léger (2005) (DL) is the rst paper to address this question. It
species a transition matrix for four states indexed by j (and k): living alone,
cohabiting, living in a nursing home, and death. The hazard rate from state j
to k is specied as3
log hjk (tj) = xtjk + jktj + jku
where tj is duration in state j, xt is a vector of exogenous, possibly time-varying
covariates, and u is a single-factor unobserved heterogeneity term whose e¤ects
can vary across transitions (Heckman and Walker 1990). The included variables
in xt are a limited set of demographic characteristics of the parent and some
3We adjust the notation in some papers to make it more compatible with the rest of this
paper.
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ADL and medical health variables; there are no child-specic variables and no
environmental variables. The model is estimated using the PSID.
The estimation results show negative duration dependence with respect to
time in spell and age for most transitions even in the presence of modelled
unobserved heterogeneity. This paper provides valuable information about
transitions in living arrangements, in particular, the importance of modeling
duration dependence and allowing for unobserved heterogeneity. But it has
nothing to say about care provision.
Hotz, McGarry, and Wiemers (2010) also use PSID data and focus more on
transitions concerning coresidence of parents and children. The results imply
that coresidence benets children at least as often as it benets parents. The
direction of this e¤ect explains the existence of coresiding children who report
no care provided to parents (Hiedemann and Stern 1998; Engers and Stern 2002;
Byrne et al. 2009).
Heitmuller and Michaud (2006) (HM) models work and caring behavior to-
gether. In some sense, one might think of this as a dynamic version of Ettner
(1995). HM models hours worked as
hit = xith + hhhit 1 +
X
k=1;2
hdkdkit 1 + u
h
it; (1)
where hit is a latent measure of work for (potential) caregiver i at time t with
hit = 1 (h

it > 0) ;
xit is a vector of exogenous covariates, dkit is a dummy variable for care provision
of type k, and uhit is an error. Care provision is modeled as dkit = 0; 1; 2, denot-
ing di¤erent intensities of care provision (increasing with dkit). The equation
determining the level of care to provide is
djit = xitdj + djhhit 1 +
X
k=1;2
X
j=1;2
djdkdkit 1 + u
d
jit; j = 1; 2; (2)
d0it = 0;
d1it = 1 (d

1it > 0) 1 (d

1it > d

2it) ; d2it = 1 (d

2it > 0) 1 (d

2it > d

1it) :
The error, uit =
 
uhit; u
d
jit
0
, is modelled as
uit = ei + "it;
Eeie
0
i = 
e;E"it"
0
it = 
":
The model is estimated using maximum simulated likelihood estimation on
British data.
It should be noted that HM avoids multiple equilibrium problems by exclud-
ing dkit, k = 1; 2, from equation (1) and hit from equation (2) (Heckman 1978).
However, it is likely that work hours and care provision should be determined
contemporaneously. One can imagine that equations (1) and (2) are reduced
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form equations associated with rst order conditions from a well-specied dy-
namic programming model. HM also make an adjustment for initial conditions
issues. Some child characteristics a¤ect decisions, but, because the focus is on
a particular child, there is no potential for estimating substitution or comple-
mentarity e¤ects across children from the same family which is an important
issue in the static literature (e.g., Checkovich and Stern 2002).
The estimates in HM imply that the dynamic e¤ects allowing employment
to a¤ect future caregiving are very small and statistically insignicant. Current
coresidential caregiving has a negative e¤ect on future employment opportuni-
ties of carers, but caregiving outside of the home has a statistically insignicant
e¤ect on future employment; HM argues that the estimates are consistent with
Ettner (1995). HM nds that both state dependence and unobserved hetero-
geneity are important sources of persistence in observed choices.
Gardner and Gilleskie (2012) (GG) constructs a dynamic, discrete model
in the pseudo-structural sense of papers such as Mroz (1999), Mroz and Savage
(2006), or Yang, Gilleskie, and Norton (2009). Using multiple waves of AHEAD,
it estimates a dynamic model with endogenous health transitions, health insur-
ance receipt, long-term care arrangement, and wealth. An interesting issue
it must tackle is how to use dynamic wealth data that is measured with large
errors (see below). The paper nds many signicant dynamic e¤ects.
Skira (2012) (Sk) constructs and estimates a dynamic programming, discrete
choice model of a child making decisions about caring for a parent and work
(in some sense, a more structural version of HM). The model allows present
caregiving to a¤ect current and future labor force participation and wages. The
model is estimated using a method of moments strategy on the HRS. This is
the rst and only dynamic structural model of caregiving. The estimates imply
that dynamics are important in that present caregiving has large impacts on
future labor market outcomes. The estimated model is used to analyze a series
of relevant government policies including FMLA amendments and caregiving
subsidies.
Hiedemann, Sovinsky, and Stern (2012) (HSS) is a series of pseudo-structural
models somewhat similar to HM (without endogenous work). It includes mod-
els for the choice of primary caregiver; the independent choices of (potentially)
multiple caregivers; and the independent continuous choices of how many hours
of caregiving to provide. All models include state dependence and unobserved
heterogeneity. Also, a methodology for dealing with initial conditions, which is
somewhat specic to models of long-term care, is described and used. HSS is
the only paper to include decisions of all family members in a dynamic setting
and thus be able to say anything about family decision-making issues. HSS
nds large state dependence e¤ects even in the presence of included unobserved
heterogeneity. However, it appears that the results confound unobserved het-
erogeneity with substitution/complementarity e¤ects. The paper nishes with
a thorough discussion of issues associated with using dirty wealth data, con-
trolling for potential endogeneity of geographic location of family members (see
below), and controlling for initial conditions problems.
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4 Modelling Dynamic E¤ects for Long-TermCare
4.1 Basic Model
Following HSS, we model a latent variable yijt measuring some dimension of the
care decision for family member j in family i at time t as
yijt = Xitj + Zijt + yijt 1 + uijt (3)
where
 Xit is a set of (possibly) time-varying parent characteristics including, for
example, parent age, gender, health, ADLs and IADLs;
 Zijt is a set of (possibly) time-varying child characteristics including, for
example, child age, gender, work status, and geographical distance from
the parent (or characteristics of other alternatives such as local character-
istics of the nursing home market and state Medicaid eligibility rules);
 yijt 1 is the physical (observed) measure of the care decision from the
period before, and
 uijt is an error capturing the e¤ects of unobserved heterogeneity and other
unobserved characteristics relevant to the decision-making process.
HSS present three models where yijt is an indicator for the primary caregiver,
an indicator for each child providing any care, and a continuous measure of the
amount of care provided. DL is less informative in that it does not distinguish
among di¤erent child care providers, but it is more general in that it allows for
a more exible duration dependence.4 HM has a similar structure for care pro-
vision but adds another similar equation for the work decision of the child. GG
models health transitions, health insurance coverage, long-term care arrange-
ment, and savings and gifting behavior with equations similar to equation (3)
for each dependent variable.
4.2 Sources and Causes of Dynamics
An important potential sources of dynamics in these models is state dependence
(DL, HM, GG, and HSS all allow for state dependence). State dependence is
captured in equation (3) by the inclusion of yijt 1 in the model. As is well
known (Heckman 1986), it is easy to mistake unobserved heterogeneity for state
dependence. Thus, it is important to allow for unobserved heterogeneity in the
error in equation (3),
uijt = eij + "ijt (4)
where eij is the unobserved heterogeneity and may, itself, decompose into a
family-specic and child-specic e¤ect. DL, HM, GG, and Sk all allow for
4The model in equation (3) assumes a Markov structure, while DL allow for duration
dependence.
9
unobserved heterogeneity of a type similar to equation (4). HM uses a speci-
cation equivalent to equation (4). DL uses a one-factor model with di¤erent
factor loadings (Heckman and Walker 1990). GG uses a simultaneous equa-
tions discrete factor structure (Mroz 1999) with 4 permanent mass points and
2 time-varying mass points. Sk uses a discrete factor structure (Heckman and
Singer 1984) with 2 mass points, each point having 8 components). HSS ex-
periments with di¤erent error structures across their three models. All models
incorporate parent-specic e¤ects and then they experiment with child-specic
and parent/time-specic e¤ects. All e¤ects are modeled as normal random vari-
ables. It nds that the parent-specic e¤ects are signicant, and the other e¤ects
are not.
HM controls for the initial conditions problem following Heckman (1981)
and Alessie, Hochguertel, and van Soest (2004), by approximating the relevant
probability function for the rst period outcomes exibly, thus adding a number
of parameters to the estimation procedure. Its estimates suggest that rst
period unobserved heterogeneity is uncorrelated with subsequent unobserved
heterogeneity, which is not consistent with the model. Sk controls for the initial
conditions problem, following Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010), by modelling
the probabilities of the unobserved heterogeneity types as parametric functions
of the initial state variables. It nds that rst period state variables have
important e¤ects on unobserved heterogeneity type probabilities.
A second source of dynamics is the existence of match-specic e¤ects. For
example, Jovanovic (1979) and Berkovec and Stern (1991) model a match-
specic component to the productivity of a worker at a particular rm. This
causes dynamic e¤ects because, once a worker and rm separate, there is no pos-
sibility of the two matching up together, and so the match-specic component
is lost. In e¤ect, a worker might choose to stay at a rm with a high match
value even if there is a temporary small value of the ow. In terms of the
model above, one might continue to provide care if eij is high even if eij + "ijt
is temporarily low caused by a small realization of "ijt. In a dynamic model of
care provision, such a source of dynamics is unlikely to be important because,
even if the parent changes from a child with a large match-specic component
(eij) to one with a smaller match-specic component because of a short-term
problem with the child with the large match-specic component, there is the
option to return to that child later without losing the good match.5 Thus DL,
HM, GG, and HSS all decline to introduce this potential source of dynamics.
A likely cause of dynamic e¤ects is a cost of changing states. For example,
Berkovec and Stern (1991) include a job-starting cost and nd it is, by far, the
most important source of dynamic behavior in the model. Structural models of
divorce (Van der Klaauw 1996; Brien, Lillard, and Stern 2006), career changes
(Keane and Wolpin 1997), and empirical IO models of entry (Aguirregabiria and
Mira, 2007) place a lot of emphasis on this source of dynamics. Care provision
start costs could be quite large as they could involve signicant changes in work
arrangements or relocation decisions (Sk). Such costs would result in state
5An exception might be ending a relationship with a particular formal care provider.
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dependence of the type modeled in equation (3).
Another potential cause of dynamics is human capital accumulation associ-
ated with providing care. It might be the case that, the longer one provides
care, the better one becomes at providing care. This could occur either be-
cause one makes adjustments to make care provision easier or because one might
learn on the jobhow to provide care better. Such human capital accumu-
lation could result in either a reduction in the burden incurred by the child in
association with providing care or in the quality of care provided by the child.
One might interpret a positive estimate of  in equation (3) as evidence of the
existence of such an e¤ect.
Another potential cause of dynamics is burnout experienced by the care
provider associated with longer time providing care. Seltzer and Li (2000)
provide a survey of the psychological literature on burnout. It cites much
longitudinal work documenting changes in the well-being of caregivers and the
existence of burnout (e.g., Aneshensel et al. 1995; Goode et al. 1998; Li, Seltzer,
and Greenberg 1999). Also it cites some work showing direct e¤ects of the
level of stress felt by caregivers on transition probabilities into other caregiving
arrangements, in particular nursing homes (e.g., McFall and Miller 1992; Zarit
and Whitlatch 1993; Montgomery and Kosloski 1994; Scott et al. 1997). In
other work, for example, Roth et al. (2001), Gaugler et al. (2005a, 2005b),
and Perren, Schmid, and Wettstein ( 2006) decompose changes in caregiver
well-being into those caused by changes and severity in parent health and those
caused by duration of caregiving. Most use a relatively short horizon. One
might interpret a negative estimate of  in equation (3) as evidence of the
existence of burnout. Alternatively, burnout might manifest itself as evidence
of positive duration dependence in transitions out of caregiving. However,
given the relatively short panels used to estimate burnout e¤ects (McFall and
Miller 1992; Zarit and Whitlatch 1993; Montgomery and Kosloski 1994; Scott
et al. 1997; Roth et al. 2001; Gaugler et al. 2005a, 2005b; and Perren, Schmid,
and Wettstein 2006), it is not clear one can distinguish empirically between a
negative  and positive duration dependence when using data with waves at
least one year apart.
HSS estimates positive values of  across three di¤erent models of caregiv-
ing. DL nds negative duration dependence with respect to time in spell and
age for most transitions even with the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity
(which is similar to estimating a positive alpha). HM also nds the equivalent
of positive values of  (larger for coresidential caregiving than for caregiving
outside of the home) even with the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity. It
attributes this to transition costs associated with care provision. All three sug-
gest that transition costs and human capital accumulation has a bigger e¤ect
than burnout. However, given the robust evidence for burnout in the psy-
chology literature, it is worthwhile determining how to measure these e¤ects
separately and simultaneously.
One possible way to decompose the di¤erent sources of dynamics is to amend
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equation (3) to
yijt = Xitj + Zijt +
SX
s=1
syijt s + uijt (5)
for some S > 1. Such a specication explicitly distinguishes between inertia
(s > 0) and duration dependence (ss < 0). However, for every increment
of S, one loses a year of data (initial conditions), and almost all of the usable
longitudinal data sets have relatively small time dimensions.6 Also, one could
interpret ss > 0 as human capital accumulation thus destroying the iden-
tication argument. Another possibility is to explicitly model well-being of
the caregiver and use observed measures of caregiver well-being. One of the
Zijt terms in equation (3) would be the observable, time-varying measure of
caregiver well-being, and another equation would be added to model caregiver
well-being as a function of, among other characteristics, care provision. This
would be somewhat similar to HM except that the second process would be for
caregiver well-being instead of the value of working. The advantage of this
approach over the former approach (equation (5)) is the source of identica-
tion. In the former approach, identication comes solely through the pattern
of duration dependence. This is problematic because the time dimension of the
relevant longitudinal data sets is small and because attributing s > 0 to inertia
and ss < 0 duration dependence is somewhat subjective. In the latter ap-
proach, identication of the e¤ect of caregiving duration on caregiver well-being
comes from the empirical analog to @wijt=@dijt where wijt is well-being of child
j at time t and dijt is the duration of caregiving of j at t; and identication of
the e¤ect of well-being on transition probabilities is identied by the empirical
analog of @Eyijt=@wijt or @Eyijt=@wijt 1.
There are two other sources of dynamics worth mentioning. First, dynam-
ics may occur through some other variable. For example, HM and Sk have
dynamics in the labor force participation decision that cause dynamics for the
caregiving decision. GG have dynamics of this type among all of their depen-
dent variables as well. A model including asset spend-down would also have
this type of dynamics. A dynamic generalization of Byrne et al. (2009) could
also include such dynamics.
The other potential source is strategic game-playing behavior. For example,
older children might move away from the parents preemptively to make it more
di¢ cult for younger children to avoid caring for the parent (Rainer and Siedler
2009; Johar and Maruyama 2012). Another possibility could involve children
competing against each other to gain the favor of the parent (i.e., a dynamic
version of Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers 1985). Another could involve
children trying to disguise their true preferences about caregiving from their
siblings to a¤ect their siblingsdecision-making processes in the future (e.g., an
empirical version of Hart and Tirole (1988) or a dynamic version of Lundberg
6The signicant exception is the PSID (DL; Hotz, McGarry, and Wiemers 2010), but the
PSID has very limited data on care provision.
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and Pollak (1993) or Heidemann and Stern (1999)).7
4.3 Related Issues
4.3.1 Endogenous Geography
In almost all of the empirical literature on family long-term care decisions, ge-
ographic distance between the children and the parent is treated as exogenous.
Stern (1995) uses lagged geographic distance as an instrument for current ge-
ographic distance to handle the endogeneity argument. Hiedemann, Sovinsky,
and Stern (2012) explore the potential endogeneity of geography with mixed
results. On the one hand, they nd some location moves that seem to be moti-
vated by the need of care provision by a parent. On the other hand, such moves
occur so infrequently that it would be very di¢ cult to estimate any parameters
associated with location choice with any precision.
4.3.2 Dynamics in Discrete and Continuous Choices
In the static, empirical literature on long-term care, most of the focus has been
on discrete decisions (e.g., Stern 1995; Hoerger, Picone, and Sloan (1996); Hiede-
mann and Stern 1999; Pezzin and Schone, 1999a; Engers and Stern 2002; Brown
2006; Stabile, Laporte, and Coyte 2006).8 In the empirical dynamic literature,
DL, HM, and Hotz, McGarry, and Wiemers (2010) consider only discrete choices
and outcomes. GG allow for continuous measures of wealth, but their other de-
pendent variables (health transitions, health insurance coverage, and long-term
care arrangements) are discrete. Sk models care as a continuous variable but
then discretizes it in the estimation methodology. Only HSS estimates a dy-
namic model with a continuous care variable.
One of the advantages of modeling care as a continuous choice is that it
allows one to decompose transitions over time into changes in hours of care and
identity of caregivers. For example, HSS amends equation (3) to9
yijt = Xitj + Zijt + dyijt 1 + cy

ijt 1 + uijt
and nds that both d and c are important. Also, modelling continuous
choices allows one to estimate burden e¤ects and quality e¤ects as in Byrne et
al. (2009). In a structural dynamic model, one usually discretizes continuous
choice and state variables (e.g., Brien, Lillard, and Stern 2006), still frequently
leading to large state spaces. A possible solution to this problem is to follow
the empirical IO literature and set up the model so that solving for all optimal
continuous choices involves a static problem conditional on discrete choices with
dynamics (e.g., Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007). In the context of long-term
7The fact that there is no empirical version of Hart and Tirole (1988) or dynamic version of
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) or Heidemann and Stern (1999) suggests that such an approach
may be too demanding theoretically and/or empirically.
8Exceptions include Sloan, Picone and Hoerger (1997), Pezzin and Schone (1999b), Check-
ovich and Stern (2002), Van Houtven and Norton (2004), and Byrne et al. (2009).
9We ignore some other terms irrelevant to the discussion.
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care, one might think of each family member deciding whether to provide care
as part of a dynamic problem and then how much care to provide conditional on
those providing care as a static problem (see Pezzin, Pollak, and Schone (2007)
and Rainer and Siedler (2009) for models with some similarities).
4.3.3 Models with Multiple Children
There are a number of interesting issues to be handled in models with multiple
children. An empirical issue is determining whether care provided by di¤erent
children in the same family are complements or substitutes. In static models,
Checkovich and Stern (2002) nds that such care is substitutes, and Byrne et
al. (2009) makes functional form assumptions about a care production function
that requires such care to be substitutes. In a dynamic model, HSS nds that
they are complements. The model structure in Checkovich and Stern (2002) is
yij = Xij + Zij + 
X
k 6=j
yik + uij ;
yij = max

0; yij

;
and HSS has a dynamic version of the same thing. If care provision across
children are substitutes, then  < 0 (the more care provided by other siblings,
the less needed by each one), while, if they are compliments, then  > 0.10
Checkovich and Stern (2002) estimates  < 0, and HSS estimates  > 0. It
remains an issue for future work to resolve this anomaly.
A di¤erent issue is that, in models with multiple agents making discrete
choices, there is a strong probability of multiple equilibria existing (Heckman
1978; Bresnahan and Reiss 1991). New methods have appeared in the empir-
ical IO literature to handle such problems in static models (e.g., Tamer 2003).
Fontaine, Gramain, and Wittwer (2009) apply the Tamer methodology to the
family decision-making problem for long-term care for families with two chil-
dren. However, there is no work in empirical IO or other elds generalizing for
multiple equilibria in dynamic models. More generally, at least with respect to
models of family decision-making about long-term care, there are no dynamic
equilibrium models, and there are very few relevant to the economics of the
family.11 .
5 Potential Policy Implications of Dynamics
In order to develop policies aimed at caring for elderly individuals, it is nec-
essary to accurately predict their future care requirements. Therefore, it is
crucial to understand the dynamic factors that a¤ect the living arrangements of
10Note that a model like Bernheim, Schleifer, and Summers (1985) would have implications
for  having nothing to do with complementarity/ substitutability. If the reaction of other
children to one who is providing a lot of care is to compete and o¤er more care, then  > 0;
if instead, the other children give up, then  < 0.
11An exception is Mazzocco (2007).
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the elderly. In this section, we focus on the importance of modelling and con-
trolling for dynamics in care arrangements as they relate to i) duration depen-
dence/inertia in care arrangements, ii) costs to caregivers and caregiver burnout,
and iii) costs to government in providing care.
Even if one is not particularly interested in policy interventions focused on
dynamic issues associated with caregiving, if the exclusion of dynamic e¤ects
causes signicantly biased estimates of parameters of particular interest, then
any policy analysis relying on consistent estimates of those parameters will be
awed. Berkovec and Stern (1991) make this point in the retirement literature.
5.1 Duration Dependence / Inertia in Care Arrangements
As many of the studies highlighted indicate, an important dynamic element in
long-term care is persistence in care arrangements. This encompasses both the
possibility that the choice of the current living arrangement as well as the time
spent in a particular living arrangement impacts the chance of transitioning
out of the arrangement and the possible destination. Care arrangements may
exhibit persistence due to the familys preferences (or constraints) or as a result
of inertia. For example, a familys aversion to nursing home care may lead
to persistence in informal care arrangements. Duration dependence is likely to
play a larger role if the costs of leaving a particular care arrangement change
with the time spent in the particular care arrangement. For example, an elderly
individual may become emotionally attached to a formal home health aide the
longer she receives care from the aide.
Thus, care arrangements can be dependent on past arrangements, both for
observed and unobserved reasons, as well as length in the arrangement. DL
nds that duration dependence is an important predictor of care arrangement
transitions. HSS nds that the e¤ect of inertia in arrangements is strong and
signicant. These results suggest that the timing of long-term care policy is
crucial and that di¤erent policies should be developed to reach those currently
residing in the community from those residing in an institution.
5.2 Costs to Caregivers and Caregiver Burnout
Most informal care provided by family members is unpaid. However, it can
still be costly due to opportunity costs in terms of foregone earnings, household
production, and leisure. In addition, providing care to elderly sick parents
may take a toll psychologically on the caregiver. As a result, caregivers may
experience burnout, which could result in changes in care arrangements over
time. For example, an elderly individuals care arrangements may evolve as
her health deteriorates or her spouse dies. Furthermore, within the context of
informal care, there may be transitions in the actual caregiver if adult children
rotate the role of primary caregiver to share the burden.
Given that most disabled elderly people would prefer to receive care in the
community, it is important to consider ways to compensate caregivers for their
opportunity costs of time or provide them with relief as they experience burnout
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(Sk). Thus, one way to reduce nursing home expenses may be to subsidize in-
formal caregivers. This plays a larger and larger role as the number of disabled
elderly people continues to grow resulting in a larger Medicaid burden for state
budgets. However, controlling for dynamics may a¤ect policy analysis signi-
cantly. For example, Pezzin, Kemper and Reschovsky (1996) perform a static
analysis of the Channeling experiment and ignore dynamics (which is reasonable
given the nature of the program). However, if human capital accumulation in
caregiving skills is important, then the estimated Channeling e¤ects would be
larger than reported, while, if burnout is important, then it is probably less
e¤ective.
5.3 Costs to Government
Most long-term care arrangements are not covered by Medicare or private in-
surance. However, nursing homes cost $55000 per year on average (Kassner,
2004). Recent work suggests that elderly people are spending down their sav-
ings to qualify for Medicaid as they anticipate their need for institutional care.
(Hoerger, Picone, and Sloan, 1996; Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995; Nor-
ton, 1995). This spending down of income is an inherently dynamic e¤ect,
and hence the appropriate policy prescription depends both savings and care
arrangement decisions. For example, it is important to consider how Medicaid
policies regarding eligibility and benets a¤ect savings patterns and whether
these policies impact Medicaid take up (GG). Sk measures the e¤ect of changes
in FMLA rules on labor market participation for potential care providers which
obviously also has implications for income tax revenues and government expen-
ditures associated with reduces labor market participation (e.g. TANF, Social
Security)
6 Conclusions
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